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Understandably, the Fourth Department endeavored to obviate the
severity of the statute of limitations problem in malpractice actions.
The Court of Appeals should look with favor upon the result.
CPLR 203(e): Court refuses to allow amendment of pleading in declaratory judgment action to include a cause of action in negligence.
In Raggins v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,20 the plaintiffs
were injured in an automobile accident and gave notice of the accident
to the defendant insurance company, which disclaimed liability on the
ground that the policy had been terminated. The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that the disclaimer was invalid, and the Supreme
Court, Erie County, ordered that the policyholder be joined as a defendant. This was done, but no negligence action was ever instituted.
After the three-year statute of limitations period,21 the defendant insurance company moved for a summary dismissal of the action, arguing
that since the policyholder had a complete defense to any negligence
claim by virtue of the expiration of the statutory period, the question
of his insurance coverage was purely academic. The plaintiffs crossmoved to amend their pleadings to include a cause of action for damages for personal injuries.
The court distinguished the issues of law in a negligence suit from
those in a declaratory judgment action, and concluded that the differences were irreconcilable. 22 While acknowledging the liberal approach to
amended pleadings sanctioned by CPLR 8025 and CPLR 3026,23 the
court insisted that these sections "were not intended to be used for pur24
poses of resurrecting an action outlawed by the statute of limitations"
and consequently denied the motion to amend.
The Raggins decision raises an interesting question as to the possible applicability of CPLR 203(e) to this kind of situation. This section, not mentioned by the court, provides that, for purposes of the
statute of limitations, a claim in an amended pleading is considered to
have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading
20 68 Misc. 2d 1063, 328 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1972) (mem.).
21
22

CPLR 214.

See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Jarmouth, 149 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956), in which the court noted:
The issues in the equity action for a declaratory judgment and the tort action
for personal injuries are completely independent of each other ....
In the action
for a declaratory judgment the court is required to interpret the terms of an
insurance policy. The issues in the personal injury action are that of negligence, contributory negligence and damages.
23 CPLR 3025(b) provides that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given upon such terms
as may be just. . . ." CPLR 3026 states that "[p]leadings shall be liberally construed."
24 68 Misc. 2d at 1065, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 804.

1972]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

were interposed, provided the original pleading gives notice of the
transactions or occurrences to be proved pursuant to the amended
pleading. The crucial issue is notice, since the purpose of the statute is
to prevent surprise. If the complaint in the declaratory judgment action
gives notice of the accident and pertinent facts relating thereto, it can
be argued that sufficient notice is given to sustain any cause of action
arising out of the accident. Consequently, the Raggins court could have
found that the statute of limitations was satisfied when the original
complaint was issued, and that the amended pleading relating to personal injuries was proper, even though a negligence action was never
commenced. It would be ingenuous to argue that in a case such as
Raggins the policyholder and the insurance company would be surprised, and thereby prejudiced, by a subsequent pleading of personal
injuries, since the complaint in the initial action, even though for a
declaratory judgment, gives sufficient notice of a probable suit for
negligence.
Raggins follows precedent insofar as it upholds the distinction between a negligence action and a declaratory judgment action. Under
CPLR 203(e), however, the court could have allowed amendment of
the complaint to include a cause of action in negligence, without prejudice to the defendant.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT

CPLR 302(a)(1): Placement of children with an adoption agency
deemed "transaction of business."
In re Guardianship of Ellick25 is a recent family court decision
which applied CPLR 302 to an adoption proceeding. The petitioner
adoption agency sought guardianship and custody26 of three brothers
who had been abandoned by the respondent, their mother, a nondomiciliary of New York who had been personally served pursuant to
CPLR 313.
Rejecting her jurisdictional objections, the court found that the
respondent's placement of her children under the care and support of
the New York agency constituted a "transaction" which subjected her
to personal jurisdiction in the proceeding. CPLR 302 was cited to sup*
port this holding, and it is obvious that the "transacting business" sub25 69 Misc. 2d 175, 328 N.Y.S2d 587 (Fan. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
26 The action was brought pursuant to Section 884(5) of the New York Social Services

Law, which deals with the power of the family court judge in matters of guardianship and
custody of abandoned children.

